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The  Dappled  World  Perspective 
Refined
The  concept  that  I  would  term  the 
Dappled  World  Perspective was  first 
proposed by Nancy Cartwright (1999: The 
Dappled  World:  A  Study  of  the 
Boundaries  of  Science,  Cambridge 
University Press): 
“... we live in a world rich in different things, with 
different natures, behaving in different ways. The 
laws that describe this world are a patchwork, not a 
pyramid.” (p. 1)
I will propose a new argument in favour 
of  the  Dappled  World  Perspective,  and 
will  show  how  this  Perspective  can  be 
refined  in  the  model-based  model  of  
cognition (MBMC), which I am trying to 
promote since my article (2009: Towards a 
Model-Based  Model  of  Cognition.  The 
Reasoner  3(6)  , pp. 5–6). 
The first thesis of MBMC: Let us try out 
an  unusual,  extremely  broad,  and 
seemingly  oversimplified  definition  of 
modeling:  a model is anything that is (or  
could be) used, for some purpose, in place  
of  something  else.  In  this  definition, 
models are meant to be concrete systems 
that  serve  as  replacements  of  concrete 
target  systems  (for  some  concrete 
purposes). 
In this  compact form, the definition was 
proposed by Jeff  Rothenberg (1989:  The 
Nature  of  Modeling.  In:  Artificial  
Intelligence,  Simulation,  and  Modeling, 
Wiley & Sons, pp. 75–92):
“Modeling  in  its  broadest  sense  is  the  cost-
effective use of something in place of something 
else for some purpose.”
Similar definitions (with an emphasis on 
replacing and  purpose) were proposed in 
the  1960s  by  Leo  Apostel,  Marvin 
Minsky,  and  Herbert  Stachowiak. 
However,  the  very  idea  of  “replacing” 
(Ersatz)  appears  already  in  Einstein’s 
address (1918: Motive des Forschens.  Zu 
Max Plancks 60 Geburtstag:  Ansprachen 
in  der  Deutschen  Physikalischen 
Gesellschaft, Müller  Verlag, Karlsruhe, 
pp. 29–32).
The second thesis of MBMC: Models are 
the ultimate results of cognition,  and the 
ultimate  goal  of  it.  Humans  and  robots 
need  models  (in  the  above  sense)  to 
manage  what  is  happening  in  the  world 
around  them.  This  greatly  simplifies  the 
picture of cognition:  ultimately,  we need 
models,  hence,  the  rest  of  cognition  
should be regarded and assessed, first, as  
a  means  of  model-building.  Means  of 
model-building can be further subdivided 
into  theories,  research  programs, 
doctrines,  paradigms,  ontologies,  logics, 
languages,  etc.  Most of these knowledge 
constructs serve as  meta-means – mainly, 
as a means of building theories. 
The  second  thesis  represents  a  radically 
simplified version of the line of thought 
that resulted in the “models as mediators” 
concept,  proposed by Margaret Morrison 
and  Mary  S.  Morgan  (1999:  Models  as 
Mediating  Instruments. In:  Models  as  
mediators:  Perspectives  on  natural  and  
social  science, Cambridge  University 
Press, pp. 10–37). 
In MBMC, the Dappled World Perspective 
(“patchwork  of  laws  describing  the 
world”)  is  refined  by  considering  it 
separately at the level of models and at the 
level  of  theories  and  other  means  of 
model-building.
At the level of models, the Dappled World 
Perspective can be derived from the above 
definition  of  modeling  by the  following 
Detalization Argument:
Let us set a very detailed prediction as our 
purpose. How detailed could a Big Bang 
simulation  model  be  made  for  replacing 
the  entire  history  of  the  Universe?  An 
obvious  fact:  a  tiny  fragment  of  the 
Universe  cannot  replace  the  entire 
Universe  in  full  detail.  Or,  imagine  a 
target system consisting of more than 1023 
components (the number of molecules in a 
liter of gas). How detailed could a model 
be  made  for  replacing  such  a  system? 
Since no two identical liters of gas exist in 
the  Universe,  no  model  will  be  able  to 
predict  the  coordinates  and  velocities  of 
individual molecules at every moment of 
time. These limitations are not caused by 
limitations  of  human  cognition,  but  are 
limitations built into the very structure of 
the  Universe!  Hence,  a  very  plausible 
metaphysical  hypothesis:  if  the  target  
system  consists  of  more  than  1023 
components, no other system can replace  
it in full detail.
As we see, the very idea of  modeling as 
replacing implies  severe  limitations, 
namely, the Dappled World Perspective at 
the level of models: Neither humans nor 
robots can hope to create a single detailed 
model  for  extensive  parts  of  their 
environment.  At  the  level  of  models,  we  
will  always  have  only  a  patchwork  of  
models,  each  very  restricted  in  its  
application scope.
It remains to consider the situation at the 
level of means of model-building. Since a 
single  “Model  of  Everything”  is 
impossible,  in  order  to  manage  what  is 
happening  in  the  world,  we  need  to 
generate  a  variety  of  different  models. 
Could  this  be  accomplished  by  using  a 
single future “Theory of Everything” (or, 
at  least,  by  means  of  a  limited set  of 
theories)? Let us denote this hypothetical 
limited complete set of theories by ToE. 
From the MBMC perspective, the precise 
meaning of  “being a  ToE” is  defined as 
follows:  ToE  (as  means  of  model-
building) should allow us, without any ad 
hoc  assumptions,  to  generate  all  the 
variety  of  models  we  may  need.  If  in 
trying to build a model we are forced to 
invent  even  the  smallest  ad  hoc 
assumption  that  cannot  be  derived  from 
the alleged ToE, then the latter fails as a 
ToE! May we expect such a ToE to appear 
in the future?
If,  in  order  to  proceed,  we  will  invest 
resources  only  in  attempting  to  build  a 
complete  fundamental  theory of  physics, 
then no ToE (in the above sense) will ever 
be  obtained  –  as  put  by  Philip  W. 
Anderson  (1972:  More  Is  Different. 
Science, New Series, Vol. 177, No. 4047, 
pp. 393–396):
“The  ability  to  reduce  everything  to  simple 
fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start 
from those laws and reconstruct the universe. ..., at 
each level  of  complexity entirely new properties 
appear,  and  the  understanding  of  the  new 
behaviors  requires  research  which  I  think  is  as 
fundamental in its nature as any other.”
If  the above arguments can be accepted, 
they  simultaneously  show  that  the 
seemingly  oversimplified  concept  of 
MBMC leads to significant conclusions.
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